We find that a corrupt local environment amplifies the effects of financial distress. Following regional spikes in financial misconduct, credit becomes both more expensive and harder to obtain for nearby borrowers -even those not implicated themselves. This is particularly harmful for cash-constrained firms, which cut investment more sharply and lay off more workers during industry downturns. Moreover, we find that local waves of financial misconduct are a risk factor for bankruptcy.
Introduction
Dallas and Minneapolis are fairly comparable cities in the central United States, each with a fast growing population, vibrant business center, and reputation for cultivating businessfriendly climates. Over 100 public firms currently call the Minneapolis region home, placing it 5 th in ratio to population among large U.S. cities, with Dallas-Fort Worth (7 th ) close behind.
These cities, however, tend to be very different along one very important dimension. From 1970-2010, firms in the Dallas metropolitan area were over twice as likely to be prosecuted for financial misconduct as those headquartered in and around Minneapolis (2.21% versus 0.93%), a disparity peaking in the 1998-2002 time period, during which Dallas produced more cases of financial misconduct (14) than were produced in Minneapolis (10) over the entire four decades.
In this paper, we ask whether proximity to a rash of financial misconduct -like Dallas in the late 1990s -creates a unique set of challenges for resident companies. Similar to foreign investors pulling out of countries following civil unrest or nationalization (Schneider and Frey (1985) ), we hypothesize that city-level waves of financial misconduct may temporarily taint an entire region, reducing financiers' willingness to provide capital to local firms. Among those most reliant on external finance, such frictions may extend to influence real business decisions such as investment and employment, and in extreme cases, even survival.
That banks (and other providers of finance) would be wary of financial misconduct is not a new idea. For one, when a firm's financial statements are not viewed as credible, it is difficult to estimate its ability to repay, or should it default, the value of its assets upon liquidation. Either will increase the cost of borrowing. 1 A second consideration is that a history of financial misconduct reflects poorly on the 'trustworthiness' of the firm's executives. 2 A manager that does not respect explicit rules -think about misrepresenting 1 See Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2004) and Hribar and Jenkins (2004) for evidence that concerns regarding earnings quality and restatements, respectively, increase the firm's cost of capital. 2 The theoretical contracting literature distinguishes between the concepts of trust and reputation; see Cabral (2012) . Trust is typically invoked in moral hazard problems (involving hidden actions), whereas the concept of reputation arises in contexts involving adverse selection (involving hidden types). In a pure case earnings or trading on inside information -is unlikely to respect implicit agreements, which are often featured in debt financing. 3 At best, a lack of trust imposes additional costs (e.g., writing more complete contracts or enforcing them), and at worst, may prevent financing altogether.
What is new, and the subject of this paper, is whether a firm's financial misconduct imposes negative local spillovers on nearby firms not (perhaps yet) implicated themselves.
In a recent paper, Parsons, Sulaeman, and Titman (2014) find that financial misconduct occurs in distinct, regionally-concentrated waves, involving firms in a wide variety of sectors.
Regardless of the mechanism responsible for this geographic clustering -common environmental factors in the region, or peer effects between neighboring managers -these results suggest that the determinants of financial misconduct have a regional component, making it possible to predict a firm's likelihood of committing financial misconduct by observing the behavior of its regional peers. Moreover, as we show in this paper, evidence of financial fraud in a region has a material effect on the credit worthiness of its resident firms.
In our analysis, we will pay special attention to firms with already poor prospects. The reason is that although a corrupt environment may encourage misbehavior even by healthy companies (e.g., manipulating stock prices to maximize the value of option compensation), misrepresentation by struggling firms clearly imposes higher risk to creditors. Accordingly, following a rash of financial misconduct, we expect the weakest firms in the region to bear the brunt of lenders' skepticism. 4 of the former, "trusting" the agent is equivalent to understanding her payoffs given different actions, and thereby being able to predict her actions, e.g., trigger strategies in a repeated prisoner's dilemma. When both adverse selection and moral hazard are at work, agents can choose actions to build their reputations. This paper makes no distinction between pure trust (moral hazard) games and those where trust and reputation are mixed. What matters is that there exists regional and temporal variation in their determinants, e.g., social punishment being an especially effective deterrent in some cities compared to others. 3 See for example, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) , Gale and Hellwig (1985) , Sharpe (1990) , and Bharath, Dahiya, Sanders, and Srinivasan (2011) for discussions of implicit contracts in lending relationships. 4 It may also be the case that financially distressed firms have higher incentives to commit financial misconduct, and that being surrounded by similarly misbehavior peers lowers the cost of doing so (e.g., via reduced social stigma or sharing of fraud-related information or techniques). Although the literature is ambiguous regarding the relationship between a firm's financial condition and its likelihood of engaging in financial misconduct (see Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010) for a review of this literature), a negative relation would further reinforce the hypothesis proposed above.
The source for our financial misconduct data is the hand-collected sample by Karpoff, Koester, Lee, and Martin (2013), hereafter KKLM. We describe the sample, and discuss the types of events identified as financial misconduct in Section 2.
We begin our analysis by exploring the link between regional rates of financial misconduct and the costs of syndicated bank loans in Section 3. When a region experiences a wave of financial misconduct, bank credit becomes temporarily more expensive for nearby firms. For regions in the top quartile of financial misconduct, resident firms pay, on average, about 14 basis points higher in interest costs. Consistent with our hypothesis that firms with poor prospects are most sensitive to spikes in local corruption, the effect is over twice as strong for borrowers with either low or no credit ratings (17 basis points, t = 10.01) versus those more creditworthy (8 basis points, t=2.08). Note also that because our regressions include city fixed effects (in addition to standard firm-specific controls), these estimates are identified by time-series variation in financial misconduct (i.e., local waves) within each area.
A second indication of lenders' collective wariness is that loan covenants become stricter following a rash of local financial misconduct. As with the cost of credit, the covenant effects are stronger for firms with either low or no credit ratings, for which information and monitoring concerns are likely the most severe.
We also observe effects in the quantity of credit supplied, with firms in cities that have higher fraud rates borrowing less frequently and/or lower amounts. Though the results differ across specifications, firms above the median rate of financial misconduct are about 10-15% less likely to issue significant amounts of debt (defined as greater than 5% of total assets), indicative of substantial credit rationing. These reductions are not offset by additional equity issuance; consequently, regional waves of financial misconduct are associated with less overall inflow of external capital.
In summary, we find the following: (1) firms are less likely to obtain external financing following regional spikes in financial misconduct; (2) for those that are able to obtain financing, firms in cities that have higher fraud rates are less likely to issue debt; and (3) for those that are able to obtain loans, they face higher rates and/or stricter covenants. It is worth reiterating that when predicting these credit market effects, none of the firms we consider were prosecuted for financial misconduct themselves; rather, these are due to regional spillovers from firms (revealed to have) engaged in financial misconduct to those that have not.
The next part of the paper explores whether these elevated credit market frictions have real effects, influencing either the firm's investment (Section 4.1) or employment (4.2) policies. As before, we focus our attention on firms with poor prospects, but now measure these using industry-wide declines in performance. 5 Also, in an attempt to focus on firms most reliant on external capital markets, for which any type of credit market friction should have the largest real effects, we identify "financially constrained" firms as those in the top decile of the 'Kaplan-Zingales' index, as described by Lamont, Polk, and Saá-Requejo (2001) . For these firms, we find dramatically elevated sensitivities to industry downturns. In response to a decline of at least 10% in industry-level investment, constrained firms headquartered in cities experiencing the top quartile of financial misconduct cut investment by almost twice as much compared to constrained firms in less corrupt locations.
We observe similar patterns when analyzing employment changes in response to negative industry shocks. Again focusing on firms in the top KZ-index decile, we find that constrained firms in areas ranking in the top quartile for financial misconduct reduce employment by about 50% more in downturns. Interestingly, we observe similar effects using a different data set on city-level employment, collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Following regional spikes in financial misconduct, we observe slower employment growth at the city level, even accounting for prior trends in the dependent variable. In addition to providing robustness to our earlier analysis, these latter results explicitly relate spikes in regional misconduct to local labor markets, a feat not possible using firm-level employment data from COMPUSTAT.
In our final analysis (Section 5), we consider the ultimate sequelae of local waves of financial misconduct -bankruptcies in the region. A cursory look at the data indicates a strong cross-city correlation between rates of financial misconduct and rates of corporate failure, as shown in Figure 1 . The vertical-axis graphs the average bankruptcy rate for firms headquartered in each of the 20 largest cities in the U.S. from 1970-2010, and the horizontal axis plots the average rates of financial misconduct for each city over the same horizon.
The positive cross-city correlation (0.65) is clearly apparent, indicating that cities with high average rates of financial misconduct are strongly associated with high average failure rates. Similar patterns emerge in the time-series. That is, it is not simply that cities such as Dallas have higher than average bankruptcy rates, but rather that firms headquartered in Dallas are particularly likely to fail following spikes in financial misconduct, such as 1998-
2002.
Moving from the 25 th to 75 th percentile in the regional rate of financial misconduct, or an increase of about 1.5 percentage points, increases by about 10% (0.15-0.20 percentage points) the likelihood that a resident firm will declare bankruptcy over the following year.
Thus, in addition to firm-specific variables typically employed in failure models, these results indicate that regional information on financial misconduct provides additional explanatory power.
While previous research has studied the costs, both direct (e.g., SEC penalties) and indirect (e.g., increased cost of capital), of committing financial misconduct (Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008) ), the effect of any spillovers to nearby firms is less understood. In this respect, the most similar paper to ours is Giannetti and Wang (2014) , which finds that following accounting scandals, local investors -such as those in Houston after the Enron debacle -lose faith in the stock market, reducing their exposure to equity in general. Complementing their results for retail investors, our work suggests that even highly sophisticated financial institutions can be put off by financial misconduct; moreover, as we show, firm policies and even survival are affected by these perceptions.
Our analysis is also relevant for the growing literature on trust and social capital, particularly as it relates to financial transactions. Important contributions here include Putnam (1993), Knack and Keefer (1995) , La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004). 6 Most of this literature focuses on cross-country comparisons, finding that higher prevalence of corruption is associated with lower rates of investment and development. Our paper finds confirming evidence within the same (broad) legal environment, and thus mitigates at least one of the important confounding factors that render identification difficult in existing studies.
Data

Firm location
Our dataset includes firms headquartered in any of the twenty largest metropolitan areas in the United States. The specific variable we use is ADDZIP listed in COMPUSTAT, corresponding to the current zip code each firm's headquarters or home office. Although this convention means that our dataset excludes firms once headquartered in one of our twenty areas but that now reside elsewhere, the fact that firms move so infrequently means that very few observations are lost.
The geographic unit we use is an "Economic Area," as defined by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. EAs are larger than metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), and are designed to capture regions within which workers commute. Examples of economic areas are Dallas-Arlington-Fort Worth, Washington D.C.-Columbia-Baltimore, and San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose. We use the term "area" and "city" interchangeably throughout the paper.
Financial misconduct
The primary source for our financial misconduct data is Karpoff, Koester, Lee, and Martin (2012), hereafter KKLM, which details their hand-collection of over 10,000 events related to cases of corporate fraud and/or financial misconduct. KKLM aggregate information from four distinct but potentially correlated databases: 1) Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2) Audit Analytics (AA), 3) Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC), and 4) Securities and Exchange Commission's Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). As the first two databases contain (mostly) information on "restatement" of corporate financial statements, they provide good indicators of firms' attempts to manipulate earnings. 7 The SCAC maintains a registry of Federal class action securities lawsuits; compared with the first GAO and AA datasets, this database reflects a wider variety of corporate misbehavior, which includes accounting fraud, fraudulent transfers in mergers and acquisition, misrepresentation, and insider trading. The AAER contains news releases announcing civil lawsuits brought by the SEC in federal court and other SEC's orders/notices concerning the settlement of administrative proceedings. There is substantial overlap between all four datasets in terms of events covered and timing (see KKLM, section 2.3). We refer the reader interested in further detail (e.g., regarding the data collection method itself, comparison with other measures of fraud) to their paper.
A significant advantage of the KKLM data is that it distinguishes between dates when a firm commits fraud (the "violation period") and the dates these actions became public (the "revelation period"). Most of our analysis will focus on the violation period, where we calculate the rate of fraud commission within a given geographic area. In particular, we calculate the CityFMRate for each firm-year as the fraction of firms within the same economic areas (as defined above) but outside the firm's Fama-French 48 industry classification that commit financial misconduct in that particular year. Table 1 contains the summary statistics related to our regional fraud measure. Across all years and firms, the average value of CityF M Rate is 1.58%. However, there is a large variation around this average. The intraquartile range is between 0.64% to 2.17%, and more than 5% of firm-years have no financial misconduct in the surrounding area. 7 KKLM's dataset distinguishes between intentional and unintentional errors by linking misstatements to subsequent SEC action. As KKLM describe in detail, up to roughly 80-90% of restatements are unintentional errors; therefore, they do not correspond to attempted financial fraud.
Corporate failures
Our analyses examine bankruptcy rates as a function of the financial misconduct of a firm's local neighbors. Accordingly, Table 1 also shows the average rate at which firms declare bankruptcy and/or are delisted from public exchanges for financial reasons. Following Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008), we use a broad definition of failure that includes financialrelated delistings. In these cases, the firms' stocks underperform to the extent that they are delisted from the exchange. Typical financial reasons for delisting include bankruptcy, failures to pay exchange fees, or failures to maintain sufficient market capitalization or stock price. The average 1-year failure rate in our sample is 1.73%, which as we will discuss later, varies substantially over time and across cities and industries.
Credit Spreads and Covenant Strictness
The first part of the paper focuses on loan terms, which we obtain from DEALSCAN. This dataset contains information regarding syndicated bank loans, in which one or several lead arrangers assess the borrower's credit quality, negotiate loan terms and conditions, and then attract additional syndicate members to provide portions of the loan financing under one set of contract. Dealscan reports various characteristics of each syndicated loan, including the loan spread (over LIBOR), various loan covenants that govern the terms for which default occurs or the contract is renegotiated between the borrower and its lenders, loan size, loan maturity, lead arrangers (and their locations), as well as syndicate members.
The sample size for our loan-level analysis is limited relative to the full sample of Compustat firms in the remaining analysis because the loan sample includes only firm-years during which the firm receives new syndicated bank loans. Therefore, the analysis excludes firms that never receive syndicated bank loans as well as firm-years during which loan-issuing firms do not receive any loans.
We focus our attention to the price component of the cost of credit -i.e., the loan spreadas well as the non-price components, i.e., loan covenants. As each syndicated loan contract potentially includes multiple distinct as well as overlapping covenants, we employ the "strictness" measure proposed in Murfin (2012) to aggregate information from those covenants.
This measure is conceptually intended to capture the (ex-ante) probability of covenant violations and therefore potential contract renegotiation between the borrower and its lenders. 8 
Other variables
Our tests also employ a number of standard control variables, all of which are obtained from standard sources. Stock returns are from CRSP and firm fundamentals from COMPUSTAT.
These variables include size (total assets), market capitalization, market-to-book ratio, investment (CAPX/PPE), leverage (total liabilities over total assets), annual stock returns, standard deviation of returns, cash flow (EBITDA/PPE), and Tobin's q (market value of equity minus book value of equity plus PPE, divided by PPE). The summary statistics are shown in Table 1 . When we predict firm failure, we augment the bankruptcy model developed by Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008), and so Table 1 also reports our sample average for the additional variables used in their model. We also report the sample averages of changes in investment and employment rates.
Local corruption and access to credit
We begin by exploring the connection between regional waves of financial misconduct and the prices, terms, and availability of credit. We have two specific motivations. First, trust is especially important in debt contracts which, as their name suggests ("promissory" notes), represent a borrower's promise to repay lent funds at some future date. And, while debt contracts typically include a number of provisions either restricting or verifying the borrower's future actions -features intended to make default less likely or, should it occur, increase recovery -the inability to write complete contracts inevitably implies states where borrowers cannot be forced to repay, even if able. In these situations, repayment incentives will depend on other considerations, such as whether borrowers view defaulting on a loan as unethical, or whether doing so will incur social penalties.
These are similar to the types of considerations explored by Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2013), who study strategic default in the residential mortgage market following the burst of the housing bubble after 2008. Using survey data, they find that views on fairness and morality were strongly related to the propensity to walk away from one's mortgage, despite having the ability to remain current. Interestingly, they also find geographical clustering in strategic default (as we do with corporate bankruptcies), suggesting regional diffusion in either the costs related to strategic default (e.g., social stigma), or knowledge related to it (e.g., banks' aggressiveness in recovery action).
It is debatable whether bankers explicitly consider strategic default as a meaningful risk factor, especially in light of management's strong incentives to preserve employment. Even so, the same types of factors that influence strategic default in mortgage markets, such as the belief that defaulting is unethical, may nevertheless influence repayment rates. For example, if exercising a valuable default option is considered morally wrong, perhaps risk shifting, whereby managers select high variance projects that enrich equity holders at the expense of debt holders, can likewise be considered unethical. Regardless of the specific mechanism, the analysis in this section explores whether spikes in local financial misconduct, our proxy for generalized trust in a region, are reflected in the supply and terms of debt contracts.
The second reason is the availability of data. We first investigate whether the price of credit is related to a region's financial misconduct (subsection 3.1). Note that this analysis is possible only for a particular kind of debt, syndicated bank loans, for which we can use DEALSCAN to infer deal terms. As we will see, credit spreads are higher when local rates of financial misconduct are higher, particularly when considering non-local banks. Subsection 3.2 considers whether local waves of financial misconduct influence non-priced deal terms, specifically, the strictness of covenants governing the borrower's behavior. Here too, we see an effect for regional misconduct. Finally, in subsection 3.3, we extend to consider the quantity of debt. Because we use COMPUSTAT to infer changes in total debt, this analysis includes bonds and non-syndicated bank credit as well as the syndicated loans considered in the initial analysis. Table 2 presents the results of OLS regressions, in which the dependent variable is the spread (over LIBOR) a firm pays on syndicated bank credit, including any fees. In a syndicated loan, the debt contract is between a borrower and multiple banks, each of whom contribute a portion of the lent funds. Typically, a single "lead arranger" sets deal terms, and interacts directly with the borrower during the underwriting process. Occasionally, syndicated loans are originated using co-lead arrangers. Table 2 include firm size (total asset), net income, leverage, cash holdings, stock returns, stock price, volatility, and market-to-book ratio. We also include several loan characteristics: the average maturity, the size of the loan, and two indicator variables capturing whether the lender is based in the U.S. and whether the lead arranger is a large commercial lender (i.e., Citigroup, JP Morgan, or Bank of America), respectively.
Credit spreads
Firm-level control variables in
To control for potential variation in loan spreads due to economic and industry conditions, we subtract the industry-year average from the dependent variable.
The main independent variable of interest is the rate of financial misconduct in the city where the firm is headquartered. In column 1, we use the raw rate of financial misconduct the year prior to the loan (t − 1), finding that a one standard deviation increase in citylevel misconduct (1.4%), increases the cost of syndicated credit by about 7 basis points. To capture non-linearities in this relation, the next column parametrizes city-level misconduct using a dummy variable, High City F M , which takes a value of one for city-years in the top quartile of average financial misconduct rates (2.17%). Here, we see that after controlling for other firm, industry, and loan-level determinants of credit spreads, being headquartered in a high-FM area is associated with a 14.5 basis point increase in interest rates. Against an average spread of 175 basis points, this represents an increase of about 8%. Columns 3 and 4 break up the set of lenders into those from the same state, and those from different states. The thought is that if local lenders are better able to screen borrowers, they will rely less on relatively coarse signals (e.g., regional waves of financial misconduct),
whereas non-local lenders should be more responsive. The results indicate exactly this.
Although both sets of lenders charge higher rates following increases in financial misconduct, the increase is almost twice as large for out-of-state lenders (15 basis points versus 9). The difference is statistically significant at 5% level.
Second, we categorize loans into those that are issued to borrowers with low or no credit ratings and those that are issued to borrowers with stronger credit ratings. The hypothesis here is that loan pricing to high rated borrowers should be affected less by regional financial misconduct, as lenders are less likely to be worried about those borrowers' default probability and/or risk-shifting behavior that are likely to result in default. Comparing columns (5) and (6), we observe a strong evidence that the marginal effect of financial misconduct on loan spread is reduced for loans issued to borrowers with high credit rating vs. those issued to low-rated/unrated borrowers. The marginal effect of financial misconduct on loan spread for low/unrated borrowers is twice that for high rated borrowers. The difference is statistically significant at 1% level.
To this point, we have explored only the short-run impact of local fraud waves on borrowing costs. Yet, there are at least two reasons to expect an effect when measured over longer horizons. First, financial misconduct hardly ever comes to light immediately, taking on average over three years to become public. 9 Second, to the extent that a local "climate" of misconduct is persistent, creditors may be wary of lending in a region, even several years after a spike in the fraud rates of local firms.
The second, third, and fourth columns of Table 3 allow, respectively, for the two, three, and four-year lagged rates of area-level financial misconduct to influence the (currently measured) cost of bank credit. Column 1 presents the benchmark one-year lagged fraud rate for comparison. Moving across the table, we see that lags at years t − 2, t − 3, and t − 4 are all significant, although none exceed the influence of the fraud rate measured one year ago (column 1). The extent to which this represents delayed revelation versus the (perceived) persistence in the determinants of fraud is difficult to infer, but in any event, suggests that the impact of local misconduct has a long-lived influence on the cost of debt capital.
The final three columns present the results of placebo tests, where we model current borrowing costs as a function of either current (column 5) or future (columns 6 and 7) spikes in regional misconduct. As mentioned above, it is very unusual for fraud to become public immediately -occurring in less than 5% of cases -so that each of these columns represents a valid falsification exercise. In no case do we observe a statistically significant coefficient, with magnitudes 5-10 times smaller than that observed in the previous four columns.
These null results are helpful in two ways. First, they help rule out the impact of slow moving contextual (environmental) factors that might simultaneously influence fraud propensity and credit risk. Examples might include trends in population, demographic shifts, improvements in education or worker training, and so on. Second, observing no result for future fraud spikes provides support for a causal interpretation: provided that it is fraud, per se, to which lenders are responding, it is impossible to observe a response to an event which has not yet occurred.
Covenant strictness
To complement our analysis of loan spread -i.e., the priced component of the cost of creditthis subsection examines the non-price components of deal terms. In particular, we consider whether local waves of financial misconduct affect loan covenants governing the borrower's behavior. As each loan potentially includes multiple distinct as well as overlapping covenants, we employ the "strictness" measure proposed in Murfin (2012) to aggregate infor-mation from those covenants. This measure is conceptually intended to capture the (ex-ante) probability of covenant violations and therefore potential contract renegotiation between the borrower and its lenders. In practice, the strictness measure reflects four characteristics of loan covenants: number, slackness (i.e., the firm's distance to tripping the covenants), scale, and covariance of covenants. As explained in detail in Murfin (2012) , the addition of the last three covenant characteristics improve upon the extant literature that tends to focus on only the number of covenants or alternatively the slackness of individual covenants.
Similar to the loan spread analysis, we hypothesize that lenders would set stricter covenants when they are concerned that the borrower is more likely to take actions that will hurt its ability to repay the loan, i.e., when there is a local wave of financial misconduct. Our empirical evidence support this hypothesis. Table 4 reports the parameter estimate of regressions predicting loan strictness. With the exception of the dependent variable, the specifications in this table are identical to those in Table 2 . We again use both the raw city financial misconduct rate (in model 1) and a discrete measure for cities with high financial misconduct rate (in the remaining models). Models 1 and 2 report that increases in regional financial misconduct rate precede stricter loan covenants. In particular, the parameter estimate in model (2) indicates that being located in a high financial misconduct area increases the loan spread by 2.24 percentage points, which is about 10 percent of the unconditional mean of the strictness measure.
We also examine potential proxies of higher levels of trust, similar to the spread analysis:
(1) those issued by lenders in the firm's headquarter state vs. those issued by lenders outside that state, and (2) those issued to unrated or low rated borrowers vs. those issued to high rated borrowers. Again, the hypothesis is that the strictness of loan covenants put in place by same-state lenders and/or on high rated borrowers should be affected less by regional financial misconduct. We find evidence consistent with this hypothesis in models (3) to (6) .
The marginal effect of financial misconduct on covenant strictness for loans issued to unrated / low rated borrowers is positive and statistically significant, while the effect for loans issued to high rated borrowers is negative (albeit not statistically significant). The difference is statistically significant at 10% level.
The positive effect of regional financial misconduct on loan spread and covenant strictness may be due to either increases in loan demand by local firms or reductions in loan supply to these firms (as we hypothesize). In the next section, we examine the quantity of new debt issued by these firms following regional financial misconduct. Supply-driven increase in spread and covenant strictness predicts a lower amount of debt issuance, while demanddriven increase predicts the opposite. Table 5 shows the results of logit regressions predicting security issuance. We measure net debt issuance as the change in debt liabilities in consecutive annual financial statements.
Quantities
Net equity issuance and net securities (debt plus equity) issuance are measured in similar fashion.
The dependent variable in the first column is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm's net debt issuance is more than 5% of book asset and 0 otherwise. This column shows that firms in areas with high regional financial misconduct rate are less likely to issue debt, after controlling for potential determinants of demand for financing (e.g., firm size, net income, cash holdings) as well as measures of default risk (e.g., leverage, stock volatility).
The point estimate for HighCityF M in model (1) indicates that being located in a high fraud area reduces the probability of loan issuance by around 11 percent, which corresponds to about 4 percentage points increase in debt issuance probability from the unconditional probability of around 39 percentage points.
Model (2) shows that the reduction in debt issuance is not compensated by an increase in equity issuance. We find that being located in a 'corrupt' location reduces the probability of large securities issuance by around 9 percent. Moreover, when we focus on the subset of firms that raise a large amount of external capital -for whom the benefits of obtaining external funding are presumably higher than the corresponding costs-in models (3) and (4), we continue to observe a lower propensity of debt issuance. As mentioned above, this is consistent with a supply-driven increase in loan pricing ( Table 2 ) and in covenant strictness (Table 4 ) that we document earlier.
In summary, the results in Tables 2 through 5 are consistent with proximity to financial misconduct reducing the supply of credit -and indeed of overall external financing-to firms.
The results are therefore consistent with the positive role of trust in increasing access to credit and external financing in general.
Implications for firm policies
This section takes as given that local waves of financial misconduct impose additional frictions to external finance, and considers whether these have implications for a firm's real decisions, such as employment or investment. Before describing our methodology and results, it is useful to explicitly state our hypothesis:
1. The risk that a firm commits financial misconduct increases with the misconduct rate of its geographical peers.
2. Lenders would be more sensitive to potential misconduct among struggling firms with poor fundamentals due to their higher default risk.
3. Among the set of firms with poor fundamentals, some will be more or less reliant on external capital markets (e.g., due to differences in cash balances). Accordingly, the impact on investment or employment policy should be most pronounced for liquidityconstrained firms.
The first two steps are familiar, being the basis for the analysis in Section 3, where we found that the impact of local misconduct is most severe for the weakest firms in a region.
What is new here is the third step, which distinguishes between a firm being financially distressed and financially constrained. Although related, these are distinct concepts. A firm financed mostly by equity has very little chance of defaulting, but may depend on regular capital infusions; likewise, a near-bankrupt firm may be investing at low levels relative to its cash balance, and thus, have little need to access capital markets. According to our hypothesis, it is the intersection -i.e., distressed and constrained firms -where we expect the impact of local misconduct to have the largest impact.
We operationalize each of the above steps as follows. For the first, we proxy for the risk of financial misconduct using the rate of a firm's geographic neighbors, as we have in all previous analysis. For the second, we proxy for poor fundamentals using industry-level fluctuations in the dependent variable, e.g., drops in industry-level investment in our analysis of firm-level investment. We do this to avoid the problem of a firm's stock price already capitalizing the impact of negative regional spillovers; using only industry-level information subjects all firms within a given sector to homogenous shocks, allowing us to capture the marginal impact of location with our regional misconduct variables.
Finally, for the third, we use the Kaplan-Zingales (1997) index of financial constraints, as described by Lamont, Polk, and Saá-Requejo (2001). Intuitively, the KZ index maps firm attributes like dividend payout ratios and cash balances to management discussion indicating financial constraints. We focus on the top decile of firms in the KZ index, comprised mostly of firms categorized as "constrained" or "likely constrained." 10 10 Studying low-dividend firms, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) classify "54.5 percent of firm-years as not (NFC) and 30.9 percent of firm-years as likely not financially constrained (LNFC) for a total of 85.3 percent of firm-years in which [they] find no evidence of financing constraints that restrict investment" (emphasis theirs). Out of the remaining 14.7 percent of low-dividend firm-years, they clasify "7.3 percent as possible constrained, 4.8 percent as likely constrained, and 2.6 percent as definitely constrained." Since our sample includes high-dividend firms (which are less likely to be constrained), we use a more stringent cutoff of the top decile.
Capital expenditures
We first consider whether a firm's capital expenditures are related to local waves of financial misconduct, estimating the following model of investment:
The dependent variable, ∆Investment i,a j,t , is the annual change in firm j's ratio of capital expenditures to lagged total assets, from t − 1 to t. As before, i indicates industry and a geographic area.
As described above, our focus is on the differential sensitivity to negative industry shocks, between firms headquartered in high versus low area-level rates of financial misconduct. We Finally, in some specifications (for reasons we discuss below), we include as covariates changes in Cashf low and q, traditionally identified determinants of corporate investment.
Their effects are captured, respectively, by coefficients β 1 0 and β 11 in Equation (1). Table 6 shows the results. The first column includes only the high and low industry dummy variables, as well as an indicator for a high city-level rate of financial misconduct.
As expected, both industry variables are highly significant, and with the expected signs. The
is not significant on its own, indicating that local waves of financial misconduct do not have a material impact on investment growth for the typical firm.
The second columns adds ConstrainedFirm, where we see that firms likely to be liquidity constrained are associated with investment cuts of around 2% per annum (t = −3.90).
The next two columns incorporate interaction terms involving HighCityFM −i,a p,t . In col-umn three, we see that neither interaction with HighIndustryInvestment i,−a p,t or LowIndustryInvestment i,−a p,t is statistically significant. However, when we distinguish between constrained and nonconstrained firms in column 4, a different picture emerges. The coefficient on the triple interaction, β 8 is negative and significant, with a point estimate of −9.16 (t = −2.71).
To put this magnitude in perspective, note that it is roughly equivalent to the coefficient on the LowIndustry dummy, so that financially constrained firms in high-FM regions cut investment by almost twice as much in response to downturns.
The final specification (column 5) includes changes in the firm's own q (lagged one year)
and CashF low, both traditional determinants of investment expenditures. Although each enters highly significantly and with the expected sign, we have heretofore postponed them in order to facilitate the interpretation of terms involving HighCityFM −i,a p,t . As discussed above, the concern here is that either (particularly q) may already reflect any negative impact(s) of being located in a corrupt city on the ability to raise capital, thus removing some of the cross-sectional variation we hope to measure with our measure of regional misconduct. Yet, the similarity of the coefficients between the last and penultimate column suggests that this is not a major concern.
Employment
In Table 7 , we ask the same question, but apply it to employment rather than capital expenditures. Accordingly, we make two changes. First, the dependent variable, ∆Employment i,a j,t ,
is now the percentage change in firm j's number of employees (COMPUSTAT variable EMP), In the first column, we see that, as expected, firms cut employees during industry declines and add them in industry booms. On average, during industry-level employment booms, employment growth is about nine percent higher than average; in contrast, employment growth shrinks by five percent during industry slowdowns. Both results are highly significant. Column 1 also shows that unconditionally, spikes in regional financial misconduct are not associated with layoffs for nearby headquartered companies. The next column mirrors the analysis of capital expenditures, indicating that constrained firms, regardless of headquarter location, experience slower employment growth (-4.99%, t = −9.50), relative to their unconstrained peers.
As before, neither interaction between HighCityFM −i,a p,t and the industry dummies is significant on average (column three), but when we focus specifically on constrained firms in column four, we find significant results, both economically and statistically. We estimate a coefficient on the triple interaction of −6.91, with a t-statistic of almost five in absolute value. Thus, compared to constrained firms headquartered in less corrupt areas, the effect of an industry downturn is magnified by about 50%, increasing from −1.3−4.3−9.6 ≈ −15% to −1.3 − 4.3 − 9.6 − 6.9 ≈ −22%. Adding q and Cashf low (both of which are high significant)
in column five has almost no impact on any of the estimated coefficients.
It is tempting to use these results to make causal inferences between regional corruption its implication for the local economy. However, recall that because we are using COM-PUSTAT to measure employment, it is impossible to distinguish between a firm laying off workers (or at least hiring at a lower rate) at headquarters versus other locations where it may have operations. To see the issue, consider the example of Detroit-based retailer KMart's admission of financial fraud in 2001. To gain insight into this issue, in Table 8 , we measure local employment using data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Anlaysis, and link this to waves of local financial misconduct. 11 Because data are aggregated at the area-year level, this analysis has much less power (20×39 = 780 observations) versus previous tests. However, the advantage is that it allows us to isolate any local impact of financial misconduct; moreover, it accounts for any potential impact on privately held, local companies.
The key covariate of interest is F raud a t−1 , the average one-year lagged fraud rates in each city, aggregated across all industries. As in previous analysis, we parametrize this both using the continuous rate of financial misconduct, as well as a dummy indicator for ranking in the In the next several columns, the financial misconduct variate enters discretely. Column two indicates a decrease in employment growth of around 72 basis points (t = −4.78), strengthening to 88 basis points (t = −4.25) when city fixed effects are included. This latter specification ensures that we are identifying the impact on local employment of local fraud waves, rather than persistent cross-city differences in average rates of financial misconduct.
The coefficient settles to −42 basis points with year fixed effects (column 4), suggesting that a fraud wave is associated with reductions in local employment growth by about 25% relative to its baseline average.
Given that employment growth is highly persistent, and that local waves of corporate fraud may span multiple years, one potential concern with the estimates in Table 8 is that employment growth leads, rather than lags, city-level FM rates. Accordingly, in column 5, we include the one-year lag of each city's employment growth as a predictor. Perhaps unsurprisingly, last year's employment growth rate has a very strong impact on this rate in the current year. However, the impact of city-level FM rates remains significant, with a point estimate of −27 basis points (t = −2.22), a percentage reduction of about 13%.
Another question is what is the proper horizon -i.e., how quickly we might expect local spikes in misconduct to reduce local employment. For the firms directly involved, this should be relatively quick; for neighboring firms, however, one might imagine the negative spillovers to take some time. Accordingly, in the last two columns, we analyze the predictive ability of further lags of city-level fraud rates. This leads to similar results. Relative to column one, the percentage impact is slightly smaller, with a one standard deviation increase in local fraud waves reducing growth the growth rate in local employment by about 22 basis points (t = −2.25). Column six shows the results of the discrete specification, which also gives similar, through slightly larger results, compared to using only recent occurrences of financial misconduct.
Together, the results in this section indicate that constrained firms headquartered in area characterized by high rates of corporate corruption fare especially poor during industry downturns. Tables 6 and 7 suggest that investment and employment suffers disproportionately during industry downturns, and in Table 8 , we see a direct impact on the local economy. The next section extends this analysis even further, testing for a link between local misconduct waves and corporate failures.
Local financial misconduct as a bankruptcy risk
In sections 3 and 4, we established that being located in a corrupt city affects a firm's ability to raise capital, which can in turn affect its ability to grow, as evidenced by its capital expenditures and the growth in employment. In this final section, we extend our analysis to consider geographic clustering of corporate bankruptcies, particularly following waves of financial misconduct. We begin by first documenting that bankruptcies have a strong regional component in section 5.1, finding that average failure rates differ substantially between cities, and over time within these cities. Section 5.2 then considers one particularly regional factorspikes in financial misconduct -that partly explain these regional differences in bankruptcy.
Regional patterns in corporate bankruptcy
Although we are primarily interested in the relation between regional misconduct and failure risk, we are unaware of any work that has studied geographical patterns in bankruptcy.
Therefore, before exploring the impact of local misconduct, we take a brief step back, and first characterize some basic cross-sectional and time series patterns in corporate failures over the past four decades.
To start, consider Figure 2 , which plots as a heat map the average bankruptcy rates for firms in each of our twenty cities. Darker and/or larger circles represent higher average failure rates, with firms headquartered in cities such as Denver (3.01%), Dallas (2.01%), and Miami (3.26%) declaring bankruptcy more often than average, with those in Indianapolis (1.21%), Philadelphia (1.09%), and Cleveland (0.88%) doing so much less often. 12 To save space, we do not tabulate the results, but in linear probability models of firm failure, city fixed effects are (jointly) highly significant.
In addition to these average cross-sectional differences, cities tend to experience waves of corporate failures, much in the same way that financial misconduct exhibits regional ebbs and flows. In Table 9 , we show this formally, adapting the logit model of firm failure developed by Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008), adding to their list of predictors the rate of financial misconduct of a firm's geographic neighbors. 13 These predictors are the natural logarithm of the firm's market-to-book ratio, net income, book leverage, one-year lagged stock return, cash balance, stock price, one-year trailing stock return volatility, and the natural logarithm of total assets.
Our main interest is in whether, after controlling for these known determinants of firm failure, bankruptcies tend to cluster regionally. To allow for a potentially non-linear relation, we allow for the bankruptcy rates of a firm's non-industry, regional peers to enter through a series of dummy variables: an indicator for exactly zero bankruptcies in the year of interest, another indicator for area bankruptcy rates in the range (0%, 1.5%], one for (1.5%, 3%], and one if the local bankruptcy rate exceeds 3%. In all regressions, the omitted dummy is the first category, and to ensure that we are capturing time-series variation within regions, we include the average bankruptcy rate for each of the twenty cities in our sample (e.g., 3.26%
for Miami). 14 In the first column, we see that compared to the omitted category of zero regional bankruptcies in the year t, firms with at least one bankruptcy in the area are e 1.04 ≈ 2.83 times as likely to declare failure. Taking the failure probability of this omitted group of 0.44% as a baseline, having at least one local bankruptcy increases the chance of failure by 0.80% to 1.24%.
Columns 2 and 3 indicate a concave relation between a firm's failure probability and
the failure rates of its local neighbors. In the second column, we split the space of positive local bankruptcy rates into two mutually exclusive regions: strictly positive but below 1.5%, and 1.5% or above. Comparing the coefficients indicates that the first few bankruptcies in a region have the biggest impact (more than doubling the baseline failure rate), with higher failure incidence mattering proportionately less (a further increase of about 50%). 
Local financial misconduct and corporate bankruptcy
In the section immediately preceding, Table 9 indicates the presence of time-varying regional factors that influence the survival prospects of struggling companies, in addition to previously identified firm-level predictors like high leverage or poor profitability. While this can be due to numerous reasons, the remainder of the paper returns to regional waves of financial misconduct as a potential risk factor in bankruptcy. The heart of our argument is simply an extension of the results documented in Sections 3 and 4: proximity to financial misconduct increases frictions to external finance, the ultimate consequence of which is declaring bankruptcy.
As a first piece of evidence, and building upon the heat map showing differences in average failure rates between cities, reconsider Figure 1 (already briefly discussed in the introduction). It shows that when measured over several decades , cities with high average rates of financial misconduct also tend to have high average rates of corporate failure. The three cities that we mention in the previous subsection as examples of cities with low bankruptcy rates (i.e., Cleveland, Philadelphia, and Indianapolis) are in the bottom five of financial misconduct rates, while the three cities with high bankruptcy rates (i.e., Dallas, Denver, and Miami) are in the top five of financial misconduct rates. The strength of this relation is remarkable, with only twenty data points (one for each city) generating a highly significant slope (0.85, t = 3.61) of the best fit line, shown in red.
One potential objection to Figure 1 is that it simply reflects the tendency of firms prosecuted for financial misconduct to subsequently declare bankruptcy, so that the averages shown on the x− and y-axes are mechanically related. 15 However, this issue is eliminated by how the averages in Figure 1 are calculated. The x-axis represents city-level average financial misconduct rates, ignoring any firms that, at any point in the sample period, declare bankruptcy.
Another potential concern pertaining to the interpretation of Figure 1 is that bankruptcy and financial misconduct rates are co-determined by longstanding local factors, such as differences in the strength of local institutions (e.g., courts). While it will not be possible to eliminate this concern entirely, examination of the time series mitigates the impact of relatively static influences, such as long-lived differences in demographics, "culture," tolerance of corruption, and so on. We present the results of this analysis in Table 10 , where we relate the probability of a firm declaring bankruptcy to local measures of recent financial misconduct. This analysis is dynamic, and thus captures covariation in financial misconduct and corporate failure within a given city.
In the first column, we again start with the failure model in Campbell et al. (2008) , and add to it last year's (t−1) average rate of financial misconduct in the city, CityF M Rate a,−i p,t−1 .
As before superscript a refers to one of the twenty economic areas, and −i specifies that financial misconduct is calculated outside the firm's Fama-French 48 industry classification. is guilty of financial misconduct in year t. Here, city-level rates of financial misconduct and bankruptcy will be identical.
Given that we already know from Table 9 that bankruptcies tend to cluster regionally, it is natural to question whether the relation between city-level financial misconduct and bankruptcy shown in Table 10 represents a distinct finding. In column 3, we include as a predictor HighCityFM −i,a p,t−1 , a dummy variable that takes a value of one if last year's (t − 1) rate of financial misconduct in firm j's area (a) was above the 75 th percentile. The portfolio (p) of these firms are constructed outside the firm's Fama-French 48 industry (−i).
Comparing columns 2 and 3 in Table 10 , although accounting for a high rate of local firm failure (> 3%) modestly reduces the effect of city-level financial misconduct, the coefficient on HighCityF M remains highly significant (0.23, t = 3.96), maintaining about four-fifths of its magnitude. (A similar conclusion obtains when comparing the respective coefficients on a dummy variable for > 3% in city-level bankruptcy rates between Tables 9 and 10 .)
The final four columns account for time-series variation in bankruptcy rates for a number of relevant portfolios. Like we did for city-level bankruptcy in column 3, column 4 includes the same dummy variable, but for firms in the same Fama-French industry (i), but outside the area (−a). Likewise, column 5 considers firms in the same region (a) and industry (i). The second to last column accounts for spikes in market-wide bankruptcy not otherwise accounted for in these other portfolios. Our objective with all these controls is to ensure that our identification of any effect for city-level financial misconduct is distinct from any existing time-series trends in firm failure. The stability of the coefficient across all specifications suggests that this is the case.
Our conclusion is that although local waves of misconduct appear to partly explain the regional clustering of corporate bankruptcy, the majority of the effect remains unexplained.
We view the identification of these local factors as interesting avenues for future research.
Conclusion
This paper studies the relation between a region's financial misconduct, and the prospects of financially distressed firms headquartered nearby. Our findings are as follows:
1. Following regional waves of financial misconduct, credit market conditions tighten for borrowers headquartered in the region. Spreads for syndicated loans are 15-20 basis points higher, and covenants are stricter. Firms closest to default are the most impacted.
2. Capital flows are also impacted. Firms in corrupt areas raise less debt (as a percentage of assets) and lower capital overall.
3. These effects appear to have real effects on investment and employment policies. Following a wave of misconduct, nearby financially constrained firms are less able to weather industry downturns, experiencing sharp declines in investment and employment.
4.
A firm is more likely to go bankrupt, (at least) up to three years following a spike in regional misconduct. This suggests that regional factors, particularly those related to financial fraud and/or misconduct, can improve the efficacy of empirical models predicting firm survival.
Together, these results indicate that financial misconduct negatively impacts nearby companies. Moreover, because of its eventual impact on local bankruptcy and employment rates, our findings indicate that beyond the firms implicated directly, financial fraud can have broad and long-lasting impact on a local economy.
The primary mechanism we have in mind is the local breakdown of trust, or the belief in one's counter party to perform their obligations, formal or not. Trust features prominently in many business decisions: CEOs are trusted not to abscond with signing bonuses, scientists to protect intellectual property, equity holders to repay their creditors, and executives to report financial performance honestly. In these and many other situations, higher levels of trust reduce deadweight costs (e.g., writing more complete contracts or enforcing them), and allowing resources to be redirected to more productive activities. One contribution of this paper is to highlight the importance of trust for financially fragile firms, not only because they face harsh incentive and information problems, but also because their reliance on external capital markets directly exposes them to these contracting frictions. As a result, a lack of trust may accentuate the already negative effects of distress, and hasten a struggling firm's demise.
While most of our analysis has focused on the adverse response of creditors to (downward) trust shocks, similar arguments can be made for a firm's other stakeholders. For example, workers asked to develop firm-specific human capital are implicitly entering into an implicit contract, and like creditors, are potentially exposed to losses should the firm deviate from its expected behavior (e.g., abruptly changing strategy). Indeed, our results on employment growth may be, in part, caused by the reluctance of workers to join firms they perceive as less credible and/or trustworthy, similar to problems faced by firms in financial distress (Titman (1984) ). Along these lines, it would be interesting to know whether workers voluntarily leave firms following local waves of financial misconduct, or whether the employment reductions we observe are manifestations of capital constraints.
Another open question is the role played by information intermediaries in the effects we observe. Recall that the effects of financial misconduct in credit markets are much stronger for non-local lenders. One interpretation of this result is that non-local lenders are comparatively less informed about local trust and/or corruption, so that events like financial misconduct play a more important role when they form expectations. Further refining this interpretation might involve using differential local media coverage to the same event, an exercise most appropriate in the pre-internet years.
Finally, we note that although not the primary goal of this study, we find large regional effects in corporate failures. While local waves of financial misconduct are strongly related to future bankruptcies, this does not fully explain the geographic clustering in bankruptcies.
That is, even though regional misconduct presents a risk for failure, the remaining effect of the bankruptcy rates of a firms neighbors (even those operating in different sectors) continues to be very strong. One possible explanation for this finding is that our proxy is imperfect, and thereby captures only a small part of the broader relation between variation in regional social capital and bankruptcy risk. However, it is also possible that we are picking up the effects of other local factors such as shocks to labor markets, election outcomes, changes in local tax rates, or even extreme weather events (e.g., Hurricane Katrina). We view these as promising avenues for future research. (3) and (4) separate the sample into loans issued by same-state lenders and those issued by out-of-state lenders, respectively. Models (5) and (6) separate the loan sample into loans issued to firms with low or no credit rating, and those issued to firms with high credit rating (BBB or above), respectively. The t-stats are reported in parentheses.
(1) (5) and (6) separate the loan sample into loans issued to firms with low or no credit rating, and those issued to firms with high credit rating (BBB or above), respectively. The t-stats are reported in parentheses.
(1) This table contains the parameter estimates of logit regressions predicting security issuance. The dependent variables are the following indicator variables: Debt > 5%, which takes the value of 1 if the firm's net debt issuance is more than 5% of book asset and 0 otherwise; or (D + E) > 5%, which takes the value of 1 if the firm's combined net debt and equity issuance is more than 5% of book asset, and 0 otherwise. In model (3), we limit the sample to firms whose net debt issuance or net equity issuance is more than 5% of book asset. In model (4), we limit the sample to firms whose net security (i.e., debt plus equity) issuance is more than 5% of book asset, i.e., if the indicator variable (D + E) > 5% equals to 1. High City FM takes the value of 1 if the city-level financial misconduct rate (calculated outside the firm's FF48 industry) is in the top quartile. The t-stats in parentheses are calculated by clustering errors at the firm level.
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